Reference · Cheat Sheet 04

Best Responses & Nash Equilibrium

Core idea: a Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile where every player is best-responding to everyone else. No one can do better by unilaterally changing their own choice. It's a self-enforcing standoff — stable even when it's not the best outcome for anyone.

The best-response method

  1. Scan each column. In each column, find the row player's highest payoff and mark it (underline, circle, bold). That's the row player's best response to that column strategy.
  2. Scan each row. In each row, find the column player's highest payoff and mark it. That's the column player's best response to that row strategy.
  3. Find doubly-marked cells. Any cell where both players' best replies coincide is a Nash equilibrium. Mark it clearly.
  4. Check for zero, one, or several. There may be no pure equilibrium, one unique equilibrium, or multiple. All are valid outcomes of the method.

Worked example 1 — keyword auction (unique equilibrium)

Monthly patient bookings (you, rival). Run dominates for both → unique Nash at (Run, Run).
Rival: Run adsRival: Pause ads
You: Run ads6, 6 ← Nash ⬅12, 4
You: Pause ads4, 129, 9

Worked example 2 — partner integration (two equilibria)

Coordination value (you, partner). No dominant strategy → two Nash equilibria.
Partner: AdoptPartner: Keep own
You: Adopt4, 4 ← Nash ⬅0, 3
You: Keep own3, 02, 2 ← Nash ⬅

(Adopt, Adopt) = Nash ✓

If you switch to Keep while partner Adopts: 4 → 3. Loss. You don't switch. Partner same. Nobody moves.

(Keep, Keep) = Nash ✓

If you switch to Adopt while partner Keeps: 2 → 0. Loss. You don't switch. Partner same. Nobody moves.

Caution — equilibrium ≠ efficient: a Nash equilibrium is only guaranteed to be stable, not optimal. (Run, Run) at (6,6) and (Keep, Keep) at (2,2) are both stable standoffs — yet both are worse than an outcome that nobody will unilaterally move toward. Stability and efficiency are separate questions.
Note on mixed strategies: some games have no pure Nash equilibrium. When no single fixed-strategy profile forms a mutual best response, players must randomise — producing a mixed-strategy equilibrium. That's a story for a later lesson; always check for pure equilibria first using this method.

Key definitions